
X100 loses $4.8 million to flashloan-funded governance attack on Ethereum
X100 lost $4.8 million in a governance attack on Ethereum on 24 October, according to DefiLlama, in a technique that uses flashloans to swing token-based votes.
In brief
- X100 lost $4.8 million in a hack on Ethereum dated 24 October 2026, per DefiLlama's hacks database.
- DefiLlama classifies the incident as a governance exploit carried out with a flashloan governance attack technique.
- The case highlights how token-weighted voting can be captured with borrowed capital that exists only within a single transaction.
What happened
X100, a project on Ethereum, lost $4.8 million in an exploit recorded on 24 October 2026, according to DefiLlama's hacks database DefiLlama's hacks database.
The tracker files the incident under the governance category and labels the technique a flashloan governance attack.
That classification points to a specific pattern: an attacker borrows a large token position through a flashloan, uses it to influence a governance vote, and repays the loan within the same transaction.
DefiLlama's entry does not detail which proposal was targeted, how the vote was structured or which contracts were drained, and no independent confirmation of the mechanics was available in the material reviewed.
Why it matters
Governance attacks turn a protocol's own decision-making process into the entry point.
Where voting power is weighted by token balance rather than by locked or time-committed holdings, borrowed capital can be enough to pass a proposal that moves funds.
Because flashloans require no collateral and are settled atomically, the attacker needs only transaction fees and available liquidity, not a lasting stake in the project.
The $4.8 million figure places the X100 incident among the larger governance-related losses tracked this year, based on DefiLlama's classification X100 lost $4.8M.
The database records the loss amount and attack type but not a breakdown by asset or chain segment beyond Ethereum.
What to watch
The open questions are procedural: whether X100 publishes a post-mortem identifying the exploited proposal, whether the affected contracts can be paused or upgraded, and whether any on-chain recovery or negotiation follows.
How the project responds will also indicate whether the vulnerability sat in the voting mechanism itself or in the execution of a specific proposal.